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I. Introduction  
The conflicts between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and industry common 
standards in telecommunication sector have raised growing concerns in the industry. 
These highly controversial issues at play include the embrace of proprietary 
technologies in standards, excessive royalties for the use of proprietary technologies, 
the refusal to grant licenses for the use of proprietary technologies.  
Many standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have adopted IPR policies in 
order to address these issues. However, some legal disputes concerning such IPR 
policies have been raised in recent years, showing that the IPR issues in 
standardization are far from settled. This article examines the IPR policies of three 
major telecommunication SSOs under the EU and U.S. law, and concludes that some 
flaws of these IPR policies may make them fail to address the problems that they have 
tended to address, and finally it will provide some ways to fix those problems. 
The first part of this article provides a background of the standardization of 
mobile telecommunication technologies and the development of IPR policies by three 
major telecommunication SSOs. The second examines the requirement of disclosure 
of essential IPRs in SSO IPR policies. The third part examines the requirement of fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing commitments in SSO IPR 
policies. Part four provides the conclusion. 
II. IPR policies of telecommunication SSOs  
This section firstly describes the evolution of mobile technologies and the need 
to standardize mobile systems, and then it explores the tensions between mobile 
telecommunication standards and IPRs, finally introduces the IPR policies of three 
major telecommunication SSOs. 
A. The evolution and standardization of mobile 
telecommunication technologies  
The 1st Generation (1G) mobile communication systems were based on analog 
technology and mainly provided voice communication. 1  The 1G system had its 
inception in 1978, with the implementation of a trial system in Chicago. In Europe, 
the 1G system was launched in 1981 in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland 
using a technology known as Nordic Mobile Telephony (NMT). Later, several other 
technologies were developed. 2  Nevertheless, some drawbacks of the 1G system 
emerged, such as its low capacity, limited roaming, susceptibility to fraud, and the 
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loss of mobile connection; solutions to these problems demanded superior 
technologies.3  
In the 1990s, mobile technologies evolved into the 2nd generation. Unlike the 
1G systems, 2G systems are digital. The employment of digital technology has a 
number of advantages, including increased capacity, greater security against fraud, 
and more advanced services. However, the application of digital technology made 
telecommunication systems more complex than ever. The mobile telecommunication 
sector involves many components. The network operators provide communication 
services, while device manufacturers provide network equipments and handsets, and 
component manufacturers provide chipsets and parts of network equipments and 
handsets. For mobile telecommunication systems to function properly, all of those 
components must seamlessly interface with each other. With the goal being to secure 
compatibility and interoperability between many components, devices and networks, 
worldwide standards for mobile telecommunications became crucial, especially 
considering the need for roaming capabilities among different countries and networks.  
However, no single 2G standard was attained. One of the most successful 2G 
standards, the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), was first 
developed in the 1980s through a pan-European initiative involving the European 
Commission, telecommunications operators and equipment manufacturers. Later, the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was established and took 
over this work; it was responsible for GSM standardization. Since the first GSM 
network was launched in Finland in 1991, the GSM has achieved great success; 
indeed, soon thereafter most countries in Europe had launched GSM systems. 
Furthermore, the GSM began to spread outside Europe, and international roaming 
between the various networks was quickly achieved. Moreover, the GSM has become 
a global standard rather than just a European standard. 4  Another successful 2G 
standard, IS-95CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), was first introduced by 
Qualcomm in 1989 in San Diego, California. Later, it was standardized as IS-95 in 
1993 by the U.S. Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).  5 Since then, many 
IS-95 CDMA networks have been deployed, particularly in North America, Korea 
and China. However, the GSM and CDMA standards are not interoperable; namely, 
equipment and handsets used in one system cannot be used in another. 
In the mid-1980s, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) initiated 
the concept of 3G for mobile communications in the framework of International 
Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000)6. The 3G systems were intended to 
provide faster, more accessible communication services, including voice, fax and 
Internet with seamless global roaming. After more than ten years of work under the 
leadership of the ITU, in 2000, the technical specifications of 3G systems under the 
brand IMT-2000 were unanimously approved. However, the proponents of different 
approaches to 3G technology could not agree on a single standard. This resulted in a 
variety of approaches to 3G technology consisting of a family of standards. To 
develop and market the preferred standard, two groups were created, namely, the 
Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the 3GPP2. The 3GPP, which was 
organized by ETSI and American, Chinese, Japanese and Korean official SSOs, 
works on Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) standards, which 
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are compatible with GSM systems; while the 3GPP2, which was organized by TIA 
and other 3 Asian official SSOs, works on CDMA2000 standards, which are 
compatible with IS-95 CDMA systems. Since May 2007, there have been more than 1 
billion IMT-2000 subscribers in the world.7  
During the ITU World Radio Communication Conference and Radio 
Communication Assembly in 2007, a consensus was reached regarding the 
establishment of IMT-Advanced system as the name for systems beyond IMT-2000, 
which are generally recognized as the 4G system. The 4G system may upgrade 
existing communication networks and is expected to provide access to a wide range of 
telecommunication services on an “anytime, anywhere” basis and at much higher data 
rates than previous generations featured. The 4G system is a collection of wireless 
standards, and so it may contain various standards. Although the 4G system has not 
been deployed on a large-scale commercial level, the total number of 4G subscribers 
worldwide, including those for the two most promising 4G technologies LTE and 
WiMAX, is expected to exceed 90 million in 2013. 8  Nevertheless, a number of 
obstacles must be surmounted en route. The history of 2G and 3G has demonstrated, 
inter alia, that the tensions between IPRs and standards may impede the development 
and implementation of 4G technologies, as demonstrated below.  
B. The potential tensions between standards and IPRs 
An IPR grants an individual the right to exclusively exploit a piece of 
knowledge, while a standard intends to identify a common pool of knowledge to be 
used by everyone.9 There is a clear tension between the private character of IPRs and 
the public nature of standards.10 Because standards11 define design or performance 
characteristics that products or services must have, they inevitably cover some claims 
of patents and software code. When these IPRs are essential to a standard, it is 
unlikely that one will be able to bypass them in implementing a standard. The 
situation in the mobile telecommunication sector is especially complex. Because of 
the high level of research and development (R&D) investments and patenting 
intensity in this sector, technologies are fragmented into many separate, exclusive 
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areas via the ownership of patents or other IPRs on the part of many different firms, 
thus creating a dense web of IPRs.12 For instance, the ETSI IPR database shows that 
there are 4,380 IPRs declared as essential to the GSM standard and 8,666 declared as 
essential to the UMTS 3G standard in the database. 13  As a result, when a firm 
attempts to develop a product or service compliant with a standard, it inevitably 
infringes on the IPRs of others. Therefore, obtaining a license is generally necessary 
for any stakeholders to be viable in the market. However, firms that own IPRs 
essential to a standard may refuse to license them, thereby blocking access to a 
standard so as to exclude their competitors from the market, or they may take the 
advantage of their dominant position to charge excessive royalties or impose other 
unfair conditions on standard implementers, especially when implementers have made 
considerable investments in implementation. This dynamic is referred to as the 
“patent hold-up” and “patent ambush” problem.14 The GSM spurred one of the first 
cases in which a serious clash occurred between IPRs and standardization, when 
Motorola only agreed to cross-license essential IPRs among the other four biggest 
essential IPR holders so that all but these four companies were blocked from entering 
the market at an early stage.15  
Although standard-setting can entail many benefits for the mobile 
telecommunication sector, it also may facilitate collusion and exclusionary tactics.16 
Because standard-setting involves a group of firms that together select one and 
exclude any other technical alternatives from the market, it risks a breach of Article 
81 of the EC Treaty17 and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. To reduce antitrust risk as 
well as to address the patent hold-up and patent ambush problems and thus mitigate 
pressures from authorities and industry, many SSOs have adopted IPR policies for 
their members. 
C. SSO IPR policies 
This section introduces the contents of the IPR policies of three major 
telecommunication SSOs, namely the ITU, ETSI and TIA. The ITU is an official 
international SSO in telecommunication, which has take a leadership in international 
standardization of mobile telecommunication technologies; the ETSI is officially 
recognized by the European Union as an European SSO, which has contributed the 
most successful 2G and 3G mobile telecommunication standards: the GSM and 
UMTS; the TIA is an accredited American telecommunication SSO, which has 
contributed the CDMA IS-95 2G standards and the CDMA 2000 3G standard. Since 
the standards adopted by these three SSOs along with the two partner projects (3GPP 
and 3GPP2) have been deployed world-wide, their IPR policies can cover mainstream 
mobile telecommunication technologies in the world. 
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In 2007, ITU along with other 2 international official SSOs, —ISO 
(International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (International Engineering 
Consortium), adopted a harmonized policy to address the inclusion of proprietary 
technology in standards. The title of this policy is “Common Patent Policy for ITU-
T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC”, and it aims to promote early disclosure of essential patents, 
promote reasonable licensing and attempt to eliminate patent hold-up problems. 18 
The policy requires any parties participating in the works of ITU should, from 
the outset, disclose any known patent or known pending patent application, either 
their own or of other organizations, to the SSO. When the relevant patents or pending 
patents are disclosed, the policy demands that essential patent holders agree to 
negotiate licenses of royalty free or reasonable royalty with other parties on a non-
discriminatory basis on reasonable terms and conditions. Such negotiations are left to 
the parties concerned and are performed outside the ITU. If a patent holder is not 
willing to comply with the licensing terms, a standard will not include provisions 
depending on the patent.19 
The ETSI, as one of the leading telecommunication SSOs, first adopted its IPR 
policy in 1994. The latest version was revised in November 2008. The aim of the 
ETSI IPR policy is to ensure that an ETSI standard cannot be blocked by the refusal 
of an IPR holder to grant licenses for the use of its essential IPR, to reduce the 
possibility that an investment in the preparation, adoption and application of standards 
might be wasted as a result of the unavailability of an IPR essential to a standard.20 
The policy requires each member to inform the ETSI about its own and others’ 
essential IPRs, particularly when a member submits a technical proposal; however, 
the members are not obligated to conduct patent searches.21 The owner of an essential 
IPR related to a particular standard is requested to grant irrevocable licenses based on 
FRAND terms and conditions under such an IPR.22 If the requested undertaking is not 
permitted, work on the relevant parts of the standard may be suspended until the 
matter has been resolved.23 Before the publication of a standard, if an IPR owner is 
not willing to grant the requested license, a viable alternative technology may be 
chosen. If no such alternative technology exists, work on the standard will cease, and 
the ETSI will contact the IPR owners to request that they reconsider.24 If the ETSI 
becomes aware that the requested licenses are not available from an IPR owner after a 
standard has been published, it will contact the relevant IPR owner for an explanation 
and request that the licenses be granted. If the IPR owner refuses the request, the 
General Assembly will vote to decide whether it will refer the standard to the relevant 
technical committee25 to modify it so that the IPR is no longer considered essential. If 
the vote does not succeed, the General Assembly will consult the ETSI Counselors 
with a view toward finding a solution to the problem; analogously, the General 
Assembly may request appropriate members to use their good offices to find a 
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24 Ibid., para. 8.1.2. 
25 In ETSI, a technical committee is responsible for drafting standard documents. 
6 
 
solution. If these efforts still do not yield a solution, the General Assembly will 
request that the European Commission see what further action may be appropriate, 
including the non-recognition of the standard in question.26  
Any published ETSI standards will include information pertaining to essential 
IPRs that has been disclosed to the ETSI prior to publication.27 The ETSI has set up 
an IPR database containing such declared essential IPR information. 
The TIA IPR policy was published and came into effect in March 2005. The 
TIA IPR policy is very flexible and largely based on voluntary action. For example, 
TIA encourages but does not require the voluntary disclosure of essential patents and 
published pending patent applications that may be essential to the observance of TIA 
standards; it is not responsible for identifying patents for which licenses may be 
required in connection with any TIA standard or for verifying the legal validity or 
scope of these patents. In addition, it will not be a party to discussions of any 
licensing terms or conditions, which are left to the parties involved, nor will it 
comment on whether the proposed licensing terms or conditions are reasonable or 
non-discriminatory.28 The essential IPR holders may state that their IPR will be made 
available to all applicants under terms and conditions that are reasonable and non-
discriminatory (RAND), which may or may not include monetary compensation.29 
 
Comparison of the SSO IPR Policies 
 What IPRs are required 
to disclose? 
Is patent 
search 
required? 
Does SSO check 
disclosure? 
What 
licensing 
conditions 
are 
required? 
Does SSO 
involve 
any 
licensing 
issues? 
ITU patent, known pending 
patent application 
No No RF or 
FRAND 
No 
ETSI Include: 
copyright, patent, 
utility model, registered 
design, and 
applications thereof. 
 Not include: 
trademarks, trade 
secrets, confidential 
information. 
No No, unless the EC 
or EFTA so require 
and reasonable 
expenses are met 
 
FRAND No 
TIA patent,  published 
pending patent 
application, 
software copyrights 
No No RAND No 
 
III. Disclosure of Essential IPRs 
A. Failure to Disclose Essential IPRs 
According to these SSOs IPR policies, members are entitle and even required 
to disclose their own and any other third parties patents or other IPRs that may be 
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essential to a pending standard. The SSO members involved in a standard-setting 
process generally have sufficient motivation to disclose other’ essential IPRs if they 
have knowledge of them. However, these members might intentionally hide their own 
essential IPR information, and it is also possible that those with large patent portfolios 
might inadvertently fail to disclose essential IPRs. The hiding of essential IPR may 
lead IPR holders to avoid FRAND commitments, thereby causing patent ambush 
problem in the future. Besides of the inadequate disclosure of essential IPRs, over-
declaration may occur, with many IPRs declared as essential that actually are not.30 
Consequently, SSO IPR databases would be flooded with false declarations. 
According to research by Goodman and Myers in 2005, only approximately 21% of 
the declared patents associated with the 3G standards were actually essential.31 Two 
cases regarding the disclosure of essential IPRs to SSOs have highlighted some 
typical issues pertaining to the early disclosure rules in SSO IPR policies. 
1. Rambus case 
In 1990, the founders of Rambus filed patent applications claiming the 
invention of a faster architecture for dynamic random access memory (DRAM). 
While Rambus was developing a patent portfolio based on its founders’ inventions, 
the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), —a non-profit SSO, was 
undertaking the standardization of DRAM technologies. Rambus attended a meeting 
of technical committee that was working on synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) standards 
for the JEDEC in 1991 and later officially joined the JEDEC. In 1993, the committee 
voted on and approved the completed standard. The SDRAM standard includes two of 
the four technologies over which Rambus asserted patent rights. In 1995, the technical 
committee was to develop an advanced double data rate (DDR) SDRAM standard. 
The committee discussed the technological issues at the December 1995 meeting, 
which was Rambus’s last meeting as a JEDEC member. At the last meeting, Rambus 
held that “no patents that were essential to the manufacture or use of devices 
complying with any JEDEC standard, and that when JEDEC issued the SDRAM 
standard Rambus had no pending patent claims that would necessarily have been 
infringed by a device compliant with that standard.” 32  Latter Rambus formally 
withdrew from the JEDEC on June 17, 1996. After Rambus’s departure, in 1998 the 
committee adopted the DDR SDRAM standard, which included all four of the 
Rambus patents. Starting in 1999, Rambus informed major DRAM and chipset 
manufacturers that it held patent rights over the technologies included in the JEDEC’s 
SDRAM and DDR SDRAM standards and that the continued manufacture, sale, or 
use of products compliant with those standards infringed on its rights. 
On June 18, 2002, the FTC filed a complaint alleging that Rambus breached 
JEDEC policies requiring it to disclose patent information related to standardization 
works and that the disclosures it had made were misleading. Due to this deceptive 
conduct, the FTC maintained, Rambus had unlawfully monopolized four technology 
markets in which its patented technologies compete with alternative innovations in 
addressing technical issues related to DRAM design. The FTC held that Rambus 
                                               
30 Larry Goldstein and Brian Kearsey, Technology patent licensing : an international reference on 21st 
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willfully and intentionally engaged in misrepresentations, omissions, and other 
practices that misled JEDEC members about intellectual property information that 
was “highly material” to the standard-setting process. The FTC noted that “but for 
Rambus’s deceptive course of conduct, JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus’s 
patented technologies from the JEDEC DRAM standards, or would have demanded 
assurances of reasonable and non-discriminatory license fees, with an opportunity for 
ex ante licensing negotiations.” 33  It was concluded that Rambus’s deception of 
JEDEC “significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power.”34 The FTC 
rendered a separate remedial opinion. In the opinion, it decided to compel licensing at 
“reasonable royalty rates,” which it calculated based on what it believed would have 
resulted from negotiations between Rambus and manufacturers before the JEDEC 
committed to the standards. 
Rambus appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The Court, 
however, held that the FTC had failed to demonstrate that the JEDEC would have 
standardized other technologies had it known the full scope of Rambus’s intellectual 
property; it stated that Rambus’s conduct had merely enabled it to avoid the JEDEC 
from obtaining assurances from Rambus regarding RAND licensing terms, such 
conduct alone was not exclusionary.35 The FTC’s decision was thus reversed. The 
FTC appealed to the US Supreme Court, but the Court denied it in February 2009. 
2. Dell case 
In 1992, the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), —a non-profit 
SSO, adopted a computer hardware standard called the VL-Bus standard, which 
governs information transmission between a computer’s CPU and its peripheral 
devices. Dell had participated in the standard-setting process. Each of the members 
voting for the standard was required to affirm that they did not own any IPRs 
covering the VL-Bus standard. A Dell representative certified in writing that, to the 
best of his knowledge, this standard proposal “does not infringe on any trademarks, 
copyrights, or patents” that Dell possessed.36 However, in reality, Dell had obtained a 
patent covering the standard in 1991. After the adoption of that standard, and after 
computer manufacturers had sold more than 1.4 million personal computers 
incorporating the VL-bus, Dell contacted certain VESA members and claimed patent 
infringement based on the use of the VL-bus standard. The FTC launched an 
investigation against Dell. The FTC stated that the VESA “would have implemented a 
different non-proprietary design had it been informed of the patent conflict during the 
certification process, and where Dell failed to act in good faith to identify and disclose 
patent conflicts.”37 However, Dell argued that its representative was not aware either 
of the patent or of the potential infringement at the time of voting and that it did not 
intentionally and knowingly mislead the VESA. Nevertheless, the FTC was not 
convinced. In 1995, Dell entered into a consent decree with the FTC. As part of the 
consent decree, Dell has agreed not to enforce its patent against any implementer of 
the standard. 38  The FTC was of the opinion that Dell’s activities might harm 
competition and consumers, and the remedy in this case (i.e. not enforcing the patent) 
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37 Ibid., 625. 
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was consistent with the equitable estoppel, in which courts precluded patent holders 
from enforcing patents when they failed to properly disclose the existence of those 
patents.39 But it also clarified that it was not creating a general rule that inadvertence 
in the standard-set-ting process provides a basis for enforcement action, but instead 
stated that this action was only limited to the special circumstances of this case.40 
B. Intentionally disclosing fraud IPR information may harm 
competition 
The purpose of disclosure requirement in IPR policies is to request essential 
IPR holders’ assurance of licensing their essential IPRs on FRAND terms and 
conditions. It would otherwise exclude such IPRs from being incorporated in a 
pending standard in case the request is refused, and therefore avoid patent ambush. 
However, either disclosing incorrect IPR information intentionally or inadvertently to 
a SSO may circumvent these IPR policies. The binding effect of disclosure rules in 
SSOs IPR policies relies heavily on the legal liability provided by antitrust law and 
other legal instruments. This session finds that the Rambus decision failed to identify 
the anticompetitive effect of intentionally disclosing fraud IPR information to an SSO 
and it may provide a reverse incentive for complying with SSOs’ IPR policies. 
The possession of market power in the relevant market and the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident may be subject to liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.41 Members of 
SSOs intentionally disclosing fraud IPR information, thereby rendering their 
technologies incorporated into a standard, may obtain strong market power well in 
excess of that the IPRs are supposed to grant. Before an SSO adopts a standard, there 
is often vigorous competition among different technologies for incorporation into that 
standard. After implementing a standard, industry members are locked in the standard 
and the standardized technology starts to dominate.42 In the Rambus case, 90% of 
DRAM production was compliant with the standards at issue, and therefore, the 
technologies adopted in the standards enjoy a similar level of dominance over their 
alternatives. 43  Nonetheless, in Rambus v. FTC, the Court of Appeal for the D.C. 
Circuit held that the JEDEC would have standardized Rambus’ technologies in 
question even if Rambus had disclosed its IPRs. This implies that the firm’s 
monopoly power arose from the technological superiority of Rambus.  
The Court however ignores the fact that even though no alternative technology 
is available as substitute for Rambus technology in the JEDEC standard, Rambus’s 
monopoly power as gained from the JEDEC standards was not inevitable because 
users would have other options had Rambus disclosed its patents, such as: 1) avoiding 
including Rambus’s technologies in the standards; 2) not adapting any standard; 3) 
choosing a less advanced standard.44 Even though there was no alternative technology 
available, users would have the option not to use the patented technology so as to 
                                               
39 Ibid., 625-626. 
40 Ibid. 
41 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, (1966), 570-71. 
42 Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C. 522 F.3d 456 C.A.D.C., 2008, 459. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Joel M. Wallace, “Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and 
the Patent Hold-Up Problem,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 24 (2009): 685. 
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protect themselves from predatory behavior. 45  In this sense, without deception, 
Rambus otherwise might not have gained monopoly power.  
In addition, the Rambus decision was not consistent with this Court early 
Microsoft decision, in which it does not require proof of the causation by the 
plaintiff.46 In Microsoft, the Court held that it could infer causation of anticompetitive 
conducts and acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power from the fact that a 
defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that reasonably appears capable of 
making a significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power in the case of 
“neither plaintiffs nor the court can confidently reconstruct a product’s hypothetical 
technological development in a world absent the defendant’s exclusive conduct.”47  
In addition, the Court also held in Rambus case that lawful monopolist’s use of 
deception simply to obtain higher prices normally had no particular tendency to 
exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.48 Nevertheless, Rambus charging 
high royalty to users may finally transfer high cost to end consumers.  
Turning a blind eye to the harm to competitive process of those that 
intentionally conduct fraud to SSOs in order to incorporate their proprietary 
technologies in a standard and breach their commitments later after the standard has 
been approved and even implemented, may provide negative incentive for SSOs 
members to comply with SSOs IPR policies.  
C. Dilemmas in dealing with unintentionally disclosing 
incorrect IPR information 
Three reasons make SSO members correctly disclosing essential IPRs very 
difficult.  
Telecommunication technologies always involve intensive patenting activities. 
Some IPR holders that manage a large patent portfolio may positively join many 
important standard-setting activities with the intention to influence technology 
selection. However, the representatives of a member in each SSO, who usually are 
engineers, may not have sufficient knowledge of their company’s patents. Therefore, 
they may omit some essential IPRs in their patent portfolio when they make 
disclosure. 
Determining which patent is essential to a pending standard sometimes 
involves very demanding works. Clause 15.6 of the ETSI IPR policy suggests a 
definition of an IPR as essential: “essential as applied to IPR means that it is not 
possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal 
technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time of 
standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate 
equipment or methods which comply with a standard without infringing that IPR. For 
the avoidance of doubt in exceptional cases where a standard can only be 
implemented by technical solutions, all of which are infringements of IPRs, all such 
                                               
45 Joseph Farrell et al., “Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up,” Antitrust Law Journal 74 (2007): 615; 
Wallace, “Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent 
Hold-Up Problem,” 685. 
46 Wallace, “Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the 
Patent Hold-Up Problem,” 684. 
47 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 79. 
48 Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C. 522 F.3d 456 C.A.D.C., 2008, 464. 
11 
 
IPRs shall be considered essential.” In Nokia v. Interdigital,49 Nokia had brought a 
suit against InterDigital in the English High Court in 2005, alleging that some of 
InterDigital’s UK patents declared as essential to the UMTS 3G standard were not 
actually essential to that standard. InterDigital had claimed 29 patents to be essential 
to the 3G standards to the ETSI according to the ETSI IPR policy. However, by the 
time the trial occurred, only four remained in contention. After a deeply technical 
examination and comparison of the standard and the patent claims, the Court found 
that 3 of 4 declared essential patents were not real essential to the UMTS 3G standard 
published by the ETSI, only one patent was accepted by the Court as being essential 
to the 3G standard. This case shows that determining whether a patent is essential to a 
standard could be very complicated and involves much technological and legal 
analysis. Furthermore, during standard-setting process, the draft of a standard could 
be revised frequently. In this regard, determining whether a patent claim will be 
covered by a pending standard is as hard as hitting a moving target. 
Hiding essential IPR information to SSOs may be desirable for IPR holders 
since it may therefore make SSOs believe these technologies are nonproprietary and 
make them easily being incorporated into a standard, thereby avoid IPR holders 
making FRAND commitments. Any SSO members that fail to disclose essential IPR 
later may claim the failure is unintentional by negligence because it is very hard to 
distinguish whether the failure is unintentional or intentional. 
In Dell case, many SSOs show concerns about the imposing liability on an 
unintentional failure to disclose a patent may discourage industry cooperation in 
standard-setting.50 Imposing a punishment for such inadvertently disclosing incorrect 
IPR information might chill to participate in standard-setting, as all participants of 
SSOs have to review their patent portfolios carefully before their representatives take 
part in standard-setting process, a participant which has valuable intellectual property 
to protect may well considered to withdraw from standard-setting. However, some 
commentators also pointed out chilling participation in standard-setting should not be 
a problem because participation in standard-setting is motivated by commercial self-
interest not charitable or community service.51 Nevertheless, due to the three reasons 
mentioned above, the “disclose it or lose it” approach has not been supported by any 
SSOs.  
Besides of incomplete disclosure, over-disclosure may occur. Some SSO 
members may disclose many IPRs as essential that actually are not. This may bring 
two benefits to IPR holders: firstly it can largely avoid omission; secondly disclosing 
some irrelevant IPRs as essential, later those IPR holders may claim royalties from 
implementing standards. However, when disclosure is over-declared, the information 
in SSO IPR databases may not reflect the truly essential IPRs in a standard and 
provides a misleading picture of the ownership status of essential IPRs.52 This may 
significantly distort the market perception of the true ownership of essential IPRs and 
license expectations for a particular standard.  
Not only SSO members but also SSOs should be responsible for failure to 
disclose (including incomplete disclosure and over-disclosure). In the ETSI IPR 
policy, there exist no clear standards for disclosure, no requirements to prove 
                                               
49 Nokia Corporation v. Interdigital Technology Corporation,(2008) 31 I.P.D. 31,012, [2007] EWHC 
3077. 
50 In re Dell Computer Corp, 121 FTC 616 (1996), 635-637. 
51 Ibid., 638. 
52 Goldstein and Kearsey, Technology patent licensing, 35. 
12 
 
essentiality, and no checks regarding whether a declared IPR is actually essential.53 
This prevents SSO members from seriously considering disclosure requirements. 
Furthermore, the claims of a patent usually do not literally match up with the 
specifications outlined in a standard document; comprehensive and careful search, 
comparison and analysis of patent claims and standard technical specifications 
therefore are necessary to decide whether any patents are essential to a standard.54 
However, the ETSI IPR policy does not require members to do such work and the 
ETSI itself does not do this unless either EC or EFTA requests that it do so and covers 
reasonable expenses. 55  Moreover, the IPR policy as such does not provide any 
remedies or punishments for hiding essential IPR information, which means that 
members feel little pressure to correctly disclose their IPR information.  
Standard-making processes show that SSOs usually pay much more attention 
to technological issues than to IPRs; rather IPR issues may largely be ignored by 
standard-makers. For instance, in the ETSI, technical bodies (such as an ETSI Project, 
a Technical Committee or an ETSI Partnership Project) are responsible for concrete 
standard-making. 56  A technical body may be supported by working groups or 
specialist task forces, which consist of technical experts working together as a team to 
produce the ETSI standards.57 An ETSI member or a group of members may submit 
their proposal to a relevant technical committee for approval in order to initiate a 
working item. If the proposal is approved, the work of drafting a standard begins. As a 
procedural formality, at every technical body and working group meeting, the 
Chairman starts with a “Call for IPRs” in either written form or oral form, which 
serves as a reminder of member obligations under the ETSI IPR Policy.58 Nowhere 
within the entire standard-making process is there an independent stage intended for 
the scrutiny and discussion of IPR issues related to a pending standard, and there are 
no IPR experts involved in the standard-making process. The ETSI Guide on IPR 
Policy clearly states that “Technical Bodies are not the appropriate place to discuss 
IPR Issues. Technical Bodies do not have the competence to deal with commercial 
issues. Members attending ETSI Technical Bodies are often technical experts who do 
not have legal or business responsibilities with regard to licensing issues. Discussion 
on licensing issues among competitors in a standards making process can significantly 
complicate, delay or derail this process.”59 The ITU and TIA IPR policies also include 
similar provisions. 
                                               
53 Ibid., 34-35. 
54 Nokia Corporation v. Interdigital Technology Corporation,(2008) 31 I.P.D. 31,012, [2007] EWHC 
3077, para. 25. In this case, the Court introduces how to decide whether a patent is essential to a 
standard, “when the claim calls for A, and the standard requires B, the right question is not whether A 
means B, or covers B, or might with hindsight be said to be another example of the genus of which B is 
also a member, but whether in its context in the specification the skilled man would appreciate that A 
in the claim encompassed B.” 
55 “ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy,” para. 4.1 and 6.2. 
56 ETSI Technical Working Procedures, 24 November 2008, sec. 1.1, 
http://portal.etsi.org/Directives/home.asp. 
57 Ibid., sec. 1.10. 
58 “ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights,” sec. 2.3.2. 
59 Ibid., para. 4.1. 
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D. Shall pending patent applications be disclosed? 
The ITU patent policy requires members to disclose any known patents and 
known pending patent applications. 60  The ETSI IPR policy requires members to 
disclose patents and patent applications.61 The TIA requires member to disclose any 
patents or published pending patent applications. 62  For SSO members to disclose 
known patents seems not to be a problem, however to disclose pending patent 
applications especially unpublished patent applications may be problematic. 
SSO Members may deny disclosing pending patent applications since they 
might be their business secrets. However, one commentator opined that although the 
very existence of a patent application may sometimes be a valuable secret, in the 
context of a publicly adopted standard, disclosure only involves the existence and 
scope of the patent or patent application, not the technical know-how of the invention 
itself, the legitimate value of this particular secret does not seem very high, thus this is 
unlikely to be a major concern.63 Although the disclosure of existence and scope of 
patents, even of published pending patent applications should not be a problem 
because such information has already been public available, SSO members may have 
sufficient reasons to oppose disclosing unpublished pending patent applications if 
they believe disclosure may harm their competitive advantage. Indeed the risk could 
be real. Firstly, the disclosure of unpublished patent applications may prematurely 
uncover applicant competitive strategy to its competitors, as Naughton and Wolfram 
noted “when an SSO participant disclose a patent application, if not only conveys 
sensitive information to its competitors about what it is doing but also, just as 
importantly, conveys information about what it is not doing.” 64  Moreover the 
disclosure of unpublished patent applications may harm applicant first-mover 
advantage. Secondly, its competitors may take advantage of the chance to chase and 
besiege applicant further innovation, 65 for instance, its competitors may file patent 
applications that claim some technologies that are precondition for implementing the 
earlier disclosed unpublished inventions, and its competitors may also file patent 
applications that claim some technologies that work complementarily with the earlier 
disclosed unpublished inventions.  
Nevertheless, usually pending patent applications may potentially cause patent 
ambush problem. Firstly, it is hard to identify the existence of pending patent 
application by normal search. Secondly, the claims of a pending patent application 
may be modified therefore it may become essential to a standard while the claims in 
the original filed documents might not be essential. Withholding unpublished patent 
applications makes applicants be able to avoid making FRAND commitments and 
meanwhile prevent their proprietary technologies from being excluded from a 
standard, thereby cause patent ambush problem in the future. In most cases it is 
desirable for these applicants to withhold such information, as in Rambus case.  
                                               
60 “Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC,” sec. 1. 
61 “ETSI Guide on Intellectual Property Rights,” sec. 1.3. 
62 “TIA IPR Policy, in TIA Engineering Manual, 4th edition, March 2005,” sec. 1.2. 
63 Mark A. Lemley, “Intellectual property rights and standard-setting organizations,” California Law 
Review 90 (2002): 1443. 
64 Michael C. Naughton, “The antitrust risks of unilateral conduct in standard setting, in the light of the 
FTC s case against Rambus Inc.,” Antitrust Bulletin 49, no. 3 (2004): 767. 
65 Ibid., 764-765. 
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E. Negative disclosure may fix the problems 
Negative disclosure may fix the problems identified in the previous sections. 
Negative disclosure consists in four main requirements. First, it requires all members 
of an SSO to agree to grant license of their essential IPRs based on FRAND terms and 
conditions except in the case of exceptional circumstances. Second, at the beginning 
of standard-making process, there is no general requirement for members to disclose 
their essential IPRs. Third, as one of the exceptional circumstances, any members that 
would not grant licenses of their essential IPRs based on FRAND terms and 
conditions are required to disclose these essential IPRs after a standard draft is 
completed and before the draft is submitted for approval, otherwise, FRAND terms 
and conditions will apply. Finally, all members disclose their essential IPRs for the 
licensing purpose after the final standard draft has been approved. This negative 
disclosure model has been adopted by DVB standardization.66 
The rationality of the negative disclosure is that if a patent is so significant that 
its owner would not even grant license of using it on FRAND terms and conditions, 
the owner should be aware of such patent. If an essential patent is ignored to disclose 
by negligence, FRAND terms and conditions still apply to the patent licensing, and 
the owner does not lose patent rights and it still has chance to receive reasonable 
royalties from those practicing the patent while implementing a standard. Whether to 
disclose an unpublished pending patent application or not is at members’ discretion, 
either way does not cause patent ambush problem, and meanwhile technology 
contributor rights and interests are well respected. The advantages of this model 
consist in that it make SSOs focus on technological issues, and SSO members be 
responsible for disclosing their essential IPRs, and it can completely avoid fraud and 
omission in disclosure procedure. The disclosure takes place after a standard draft has 
been fixed, so it is reasonable for SSO members to consider the IPR issues related a 
pending standard at this stage. However, one flaw of this approach is that standard-
setting may only focus on choosing best technologies but miss some nonproprietary 
technologies. 
IV. FRAND Commitments 
SSO IPR policies require the owner of an essential IPR related to a particular 
standard to grant irrevocable licenses on FRAND terms and conditions under such 
IPR. However, the negotiation of licenses is left to parties concerned, and is 
performed outside SSOs. This section exploits whether there exist practicable rules 
for determining FRAND terms and conditions as well as the legal effects of FRAND 
terms and conditions from the EU and U.S. perspectives.  
A. FRAND licensing under EU Law 
In the EU, a dominant firm is obligated to deal with its customers under fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions.  
                                               
66 C. Eltzroth, “IPR policy of the DVB project: Negative disclosure, FR&ND arbitration unless pool 
rules OK part 1,” International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research 6, no. 2 (2008): 
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1. Fairness 
Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty expressly condemns unfair conditions induced 
by a dominant firm. In Tetra Pak II, 67 Tetra Pak specialized in the packaging of 
liquid and semi-liquid foods in cartons; moreover, it held a dominant position in the 
market. The terms on which Tetra Pak dealt with its customers included a number of 
customer obligations that had no link to the purpose of its contracts and distorted the 
very nature of those contracts; these were found by the European Commission to be 
unfair.68 The conditions included placing limitations on the purchasers’ use of the 
machines, committing purchasers to the use of Tetra Pak’s repair and maintenance 
services, and reserving for Tetra Pak the right to make surprise inspections. 69 The 
Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the 
Commission’s findings. 
In Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) v. 
Commission,70 the CFI affirmed the Commission’s finding that AAMS, a dominant 
wholesale distributor of cigarettes in Italy, had abused its dominant position because 
its nonnegotiable terms regarding unilateral distribution imposed on foreign producers 
were unfair; these included a limit on the introduction of new cigarette brands onto 
the market, a maximum quantity of new cigarette brands, a maximum monthly 
quantity of cigarettes allowed on the market, and restrictions on the packaging of 
cigarettes. 
The Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland GmbH(DSD) v. 
Commission71 case related to a German ordinance, according to which manufacturers 
and distributors of packaging are required to take back and recover the packaging that 
they had put on the German market. DSD ran the only nationwide system for 
packaging collection, sorting and recovery under its Green Dot trademark. To use 
DSD’s service, packaging manufacturers and distributors had to place the Green Dot 
logo on their packaging. The manufacturers and distributors were obliged to pay DSD 
a fee that covered the costs of the collection, sorting and recovery of the packaging 
taken back by DSD and the associated administrative costs. The Commission found 
that the operation of the DSD system amounted to a breach of Article 82 because 
DSD was claiming the full fees for all the packaging on which the Green Dot logo 
was placed even though the actual collection and recycling services were provided by 
its competitors. Hence, the Commission found the conduct of DSD to be clearly 
abusive, insofar as it sought to impose unfair prices on participating firms and to 
prevent competitors from entering the German market in question.  
In summary, although the Commission and Courts have not explicitly defined 
what fairness is, it is clear from case law that fairness means that a dominant firm 
does not exploit its dominant position by imposing irrelevant obligations on its 
customers at the expense of customers. The end result should be acceptable to both 
parties, and should be an outcome that they can live with.72 The unfair conditions in 
                                               
67 92/163/EEC: Commission Decision of 24 July 1991 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty (IV/31043 - Tetra Pak II) OJ L 72, 18.3.1992, p. 1–68. 
68 Ibid., para. 106. 
69 Ibid., para. ANNEX II . 
70 Case T-139/98, Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato(AAMS) v. Commission 
[2001]ECR II-3413. 
71 Case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt-Duales System Deutschland GmbH v. Commission, 16 July 2009. 
72 Goldstein and Kearsey, Technology patent licensing, 27. 
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practices may take a variety of forms and therefore should be identified on a case-by-
case basis.  
2. Reasonableness 
Reasonableness under FRAND terms mainly relates to royalty level. Article 
82(a) of the EC Treaty prohibits “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions.” In United Brands v. Commission, 73 
the ECJ held that “the imposition by an undertaking in a dominant position directly or 
indirectly of unfair purchase or selling prices is an abuse to which exception can be 
taken under Article [82] of the Treaty.”74 The Court also noted that “charging a price 
which is excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product supplied would be such an abuse.”75  
In Scandlines Sverige v. Port of Helsingborg, 76  the Commission clearly 
described the approach to deciding the reasonableness of a price charged by a 
dominant firm in the United Brand case. The first question to be considered is 
whether the difference between cost and price is excessive; then, if it is, the second 
question is whether the price is unfair in itself or in comparison to those of competing 
products. The Commission subsequently explained that “an analysis of excessive or 
unfair pricing abuse must focus on the price charged, and its relation to the economic 
value of the product. While a comparison of prices and costs, which reveals the profit 
margin of a particular company may serve as a first step in such an analysis, this in 
itself cannot be conclusive as regards the existence of an abuse.”77  
However, the Courts have never suggested the level at which the profit would 
become excessive.78 Assessing the economic value and cost of an essential IPR is 
extremely difficult especially when one takes into account the past research costs of 
IPR holders that did not result in commercially exploitable products. 79  The costs 
incurred by essential IPR holders that were sunk in failed R&D activities may be 
considered part of the cost of creating the essential IPRs. From a policy perspective, 
this arrangement is very important in inducing the risk-taking that produces 
innovation; as one scholar pointed out, “the patent system we have is based on 
something of a lottery principle, forcing inventors to bear their own losses from 
failure but holding out the prospect of monopoly in the event of success.”80  
Furthermore, cost is not the sole element at play in the calculation of 
reasonable price. The EC has rejected the method that simply adds a margin to the 
approximate cost of production to determine the economic value of a product or 
service. Rather, economic value must be determined with regard to the particular 
circumstances of the case and by taking into account non-cost-related factors.81 In the 
                                               
73 Case C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission of the European Communities, [1978] ECR 207. 
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English case Attheraces Ltd v. The British Horseracing Board(BHB),82 the Court of 
Appeals also held that there is nothing in Article 82 or case law to suggest that the 
index of abuse is the extent of departure from a cost+ criterion. The Court indicated 
that “exceeding cost+ is a necessary, but in no way a sufficient, test of abuse of a 
dominant position.” The Court cited ECJ case law and indicated that Article 82 was 
not a general provision for the regulation of prices; rather, it sought to prevent the 
abuse of dominant market positions with the object of protecting and promoting 
competition. The Court also emphasized that a fair price was one that would represent 
or reflect the economic value of the product supplied as indicated in the United 
Brands case. In this regard, the economic value approach might serve an important 
function in protecting the interests of essential IPR holders and prevent disregarding 
the real value of essential IPRs. 
Some cases have suggested possible benchmarks to decide reasonable royalty 
level. The assumed price that would have resulted from negotiations between 
licensors and licensees before standardization could serve a benchmark. This would 
be in accordance with the ECJ’s opinion in the United Brand case that “it is advisable 
to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has made use of the opportunities 
arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it 
would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective 
competition.” 83 
 In Deutsche Post,84 the Commission suggested that when judging whether a 
price was excessive in a market open to competition, the normal test was to compare 
the prices of the dominant operator with those charged by competitors. In this regard, 
the established royalties charged by others based on an essential IPR with an equal 
position in the same standard, or the royalty level of a competing standard can be 
employed as a benchmark. 
 It is also possible to compare the prices charged by a dominant firm in 
different countries or different areas, as long as the differences of transaction costs in 
different markets are taken into account. In Ministere Public v. Tournier, the ECJ held 
that “when an undertaking holding a dominant position imposes scales of fees for its 
services which are appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States and 
where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a consistent basis, that 
difference must be regarded as indicative of an abuse of a dominant position.” 85  
3. Non-discriminatory 
The ability of imposing discriminated conditions implies existence of market 
power because in a competitive market the customers who are disfavored, i.e., 
charged the higher price, will be able to take their custom elsewhere.86 Yet, usually a 
pure licensor (even one with monopoly power) does not have anticompetitive 
motivation for engaging in discrimination.87 However, when an essential IPR holder 
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competes with other competitors in a neighboring market, in which the technology is 
necessary for its IPR holder and other competitors producing a product or providing 
service compliant with a standard, the licensor may discriminate against those 
competitors in licensing to disadvantage them and favor its own markets for those 
products or services.88  
Article 82(c) of EC Treaty prohibits a dominant firm from applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties such that these 
conditions place certain parties at a competitive disadvantage. Some ECJ cases 
indicate that when a firm in a dominant position grants quantity discounts89 or charges 
different prices90 to different customers, this could be regarded as indicative of the 
abuse of the firm’s dominant position. In such a case it is for the firm in question to 
justify the difference through reference to objective dissimilarities between the 
situations at hand. Such differential treatment must not result in the application of 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage.91 The assessment of justification has to 
be made on the basis of the whole of the circumstances of the case.92 In British 
Airways v. Commission,93 the bonus and commission scheme was ruled to breach 
Article 82(c) because it wrongly differentiated between the travel agents and thus had 
the potential to exclude competitors; also, the scheme was not justified from an 
economic standpoint.  
The German Supreme Court has closely scrutinized a case involving licensing 
patents essential to an industry standard under different treatments. In Standard-
Spundfass, 94  four German drum manufacturers, including the plaintiff and the 
companies K, S and L, presented proposals for a standard of synthetic drums with 
improved draining characteristics to the Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI). 
The plaintiff’s proposal, which was based on the technical specifications of its patent, 
was chosen to integrate into the VCI standard. Any drums that were not in compliance 
with the standard were impossible to sell in German market. However, to manufacture 
the drums to meet VCI standards, it was necessary to infringe on the disputed patent. 
The plaintiff granted the three above-named companies royalty-free licenses for the 
disputed patent. In addition, it granted paid licenses to other drum manufacturers 
situated in other EU-member states. However, it refused a request for a license from 
the parent company of the defendant. The German Supreme Court firstly noted “the 
different treatment of the licensees that lies in the grant of some paid licences and 
some free licences for the patent need not automatically be considered unjustified”, 
and a dominant firm should especially not be prevented from reacting differently to 
different market conditions.95 However, the court also pointed out that the dominant 
firm was obligated to show that there was an objectively justifiable reason for the 
unequal treatment. 96  In determining whether unequal treatment was objectively 
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justified, the court focused on whether the relatively less favorable treatment of the 
concerned firms was a pro-competitive balancing of interests, or whether it was 
arbitrary or stemmed from considerations and intentions that had nothing to do with 
sound economic or entrepreneurial behavior. In addition, the firms affected by such 
unequal treatment could not be impaired in their competitiveness by the exercise of 
the dominant power.97 
B. FRAND licensing under U.S. Law 
1. FRAND licensing under antitrust law 
In the U.S, courts traditionally are reluctant to tackle the price issue.98 Usually 
U.S. courts refuse to set a ceiling for patent owners to charge royalty. In W.L. Gore & 
Assoc. v. Carlisle Corp., 99  the court rejected the claim that unreasonably high 
royalties constitute patent misuse. In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,100 the court noted that “a 
patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the 
leverage of that monopoly.” U.S. courts have generally rejected the notion that 
charging differential royalties is a violation of law even when the licensor is a true 
monopolist. In USM Corp. v. SPS, which involves the lawfulness of differential patent 
royalties under antitrust and patent-misuse principles, the Court of Appeals for 
Seventh Circuit held that “there is no antitrust prohibition against a patent owner’s 
using price discrimination to maximize his income from the patent.”101 However, the 
Court did not exclude the possibility that “price discrimination” might in a particular 
case be condemned as an attempt to monopolize or as an act of monopolization under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or as violation of the Rule of Reason under Section 1 of 
that Act.102 To meet the requirement of the Rule of Reason, anticompetitive effect has 
to be present.  
2. FRAND licensing under patent law 
According to the U.S. patent law, “Upon finding for the claimant the court 
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer.” 103  In patent infringement case, a patent holder must satisfy 4 prong 
conditions to prove actual damages, e.g., lost profits. If a plaintiff fails to do so, actual 
damage claim will not be supported; instead, a reasonable royalty may be awarded.104 
U.S. courts have defined reasonable royalty in early case as an amount “which a 
person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition, 
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would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented 
article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.”105  
Recent Federal Circuit Court decisions show that there are three ways to 
decide reasonable royalties. In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the Court of Appeals for 
Federal Circuit noted that “an established royalty is usually the best measure of a 
“reasonable” royalty for a given use of an invention because it removes the need to 
guess at the terms to which parties would hypothetically agree. When the patentee has 
consistently licensed others to engage in conduct comparable to the defendant’s at a 
uniform royalty, that royalty is taken as established and indicates the terms upon 
which the patentee would have licensed the defendant’s use of the invention.”106  In 
recent Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc and Microsoft Corp.,107 the Court of 
Appeals for Federal Circuit identified two approaches to calculating reasonable 
royalty. The first, the analytical approach, focuses on the infringer’s projections of 
profit for the infringing product. It subtracts the infringer’s usual or acceptable net 
profit from its anticipated net profit realized from sales of infringing devices.108 The 
second, more common approach, called the hypothetical negotiation or the “willing 
licensor-willing licensee” approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the 
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began. 109  In Lucent case, both parties had agreed to adopt the 
hypothetical negotiation approach, then the Court chosen and reviewed 8 factors of 
Georgia-Pacific to decide the reasonable royalty in this case.110 The Court noted that 
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“we need not identify any particular Georgia-Pacific factor as being dispositive. 
Rather, the flexible analysis of all applicable Georgia-Pacific factors provides a useful 
and legally-required framework for assessing the damage award in this case.”111 
3. Royalty stacking and entire market value 
 In telecommunication sector, technologies are highly fragmented, as Bekkers 
shows there are 1227 unique and essential patents to the UMTS 3G standard 
distinguished from all 6313 declared essential patents from the ETSI IPR database.112 
As a result, a single device may embrace hundreds of patents. So even each patent 
owner charges a small amount of license fees, finally the aggregate license fees may 
be prohibitively high. This phenomenon is referred as “royalty stacking”. 113 
When a device embrace some patented apparatuses with unpatented 
components, U. S. courts have applied a formulation known as the “entire market 
value rule” to determine whether such components should be included in the damage 
computation, whether for reasonable royalty purposes.114 Pursuant to the entire market 
value rule, even though a patented feature makes up only a portion of the product, the 
entire market value rule permits recovery of damages based on the value of the entire 
product containing several features if the patent-related feature is the basis for 
customer demand. 115  
The entire market value rule has been criticized for its exacerbating royalty 
stacking problem.116 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit refuted the argument that “the 
entire market rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law.”117 The Court 
pointed out that “such general propositions ignore the realities of patent licensing and 
the flexibility needed in transferring intellectual property rights. The evidence of 
record in the present dispute illustrates the importance the entire market value may 
have in reasonable royalty cases.” 118  And the Court added that “there is nothing 
inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product, especially when 
there is no established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long 
as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing 
component or feature.” 119  Moreover the Court explained that since all running 
royalties have at least two variables: the royalty base and the royalty rate, the base 
used in a running royalty calculation can always be the value of the entire commercial 
embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate is within an acceptable range.120 It 
implies that when the value of the entire product at issue is accounted as royalty base, 
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the applied royalty rates may be reduced compared to the scenario when only patented 
components accounted as royalty base. In addition, one factor that restrains the 
application of the entire market value rule is that a patentee must approve that the 
patents-related feature is the basis for customer demand.121 
C. Remarks on FRAND commitments 
FRAND commitments may bring three benefits to the industry. 
First, it may facilitate antitrust action against the behaviors that have 
anticompetitive effect by leveraging essential IPRs. 
In EU, owners of essential IPRs in a prevalent standard may have an 
obligation to grant license of using that IPR under FRAND terms and conditions, even 
though it has not made FRAND commitments to a SSO, as long as its dominant 
position can be established. However, FRAND commitments do have some benefits. 
Relying on FRAND commitments, potential licensees need not to prove the existence 
of a dominant position, to define the relevant market, to prove the IPR at issue is 
essential to the relevant standard etc. 
Since the U.S. antitrust law does not require a dominant firm to deal with its 
customers under FRAND conditions, FRAND commitments in SSOs IPR policies 
have significant meaning for potential licensees to avoid being ambushed by essential 
IPR holders. In Broadcom v. Qualcomm, 122  Broadcom filed an action against 
Qualcomm in July, 2005, alleging that Qualcomm had induced the ETSI to includes 
its proprietary technology in the UMTS standard by deception to obey the ETSI IPR 
policy, but then breached the agreement by licensing its technology on non-FRAND 
terms as well as ignoring its FRAND commitments to the ETSI by demanding 
discriminatorily higher (i.e., non-FRAND) royalties from competitors and customers 
using chipsets not manufactured by Qualcomm. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that “(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, (2) a 
patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology 
on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an S[S]O’s reliance on that promise when 
including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent holder’s subsequent breach 
of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct… Deceptive FRAND 
commitments, no less than deceptive nondisclosure of IPRs, may result in such harm 
[of competitive process].” 123 Thus, FRAND commitments can provide a legal basis 
for antitrust action that standard implementers can rely on against patent hold-up and 
patent ambush. 
Secondly, FRAND licensing may draw a balance between essential patent 
owners and standard implementers in standardization context because on the one hand 
focusing on the economic value of an essential patent at issue may well protect 
technology contributor interests, and on the other hand, considering relevant factors to 
decide what both parties would have agreed to, had there not existed standard lock-in, 
may protect standard implementers from patent ambushing and patent overexploiting. 
A commentator suggests applying patent misuse rule to patent ambush in 
standardization context therefore make patents at issue unenforceable. 124 However, 
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this proposal disregards the value of a patented technology and its contribution to the 
industry. There is no legitimate basis to conduct such expropriation because it would 
arbitrarily harm those innovative firms and chill standard-setting process. In FTC 
Rambus decision, while FTC confirmed Rambus’s deception of the JEDEC 
significantly contributed to its acquisition of monopoly power, thereby breaching 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it did not simply compel Rambus to license its relevant 
patents royalty-free; instead, FTC decided to compel licensing at reasonable royalty 
rates, which it calculated based on what it believed would have resulted from 
negotiations between Rambus and manufacturers before the JEDEC had committed to 
the standards.125  
FRAND commitments have been criticized as lack of certainty and clarity. Yet 
those criticisms ignore the realities of patent licensing and the flexibility needed in 
transferring intellectual property rights. Even though in a generally recommended 
licensing negotiation ex ante standardization in dealing with patent hold-up and patent 
ambush, the licensing terms and conditions still rely on negotiations and will not be in 
certainty before both parties can enter into an agreement. Reasonable royalty analysis 
necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty especially when to 
determine the correct value of the patented invention which is only one part or feature 
among many, and to ascertain what the parties would have agreed to in the context of 
a patent license negotiation. 126  The U.S. Federal Circuit noted that “licensors of 
patented technology often license an invention for more or less than its true economic 
value. Such is the inherent risk in licensing intangible assets that may have no 
establishment market value.”127 Therefore, FRAND licensing is not less certainty than 
any other commercial licensing schemes. FRAND licensing is a reasonable measure 
to address patent-ambush problem in standardization context. 
To determine reasonable royalty level, EU law and the U.S. law seem to both 
agree to consider what the value of the invention at issue, and what both parties would 
have agreed to in the context of a patent licensing negotiation. 128  However, in 
standardization context, the supposed timing when parties would have entered into a 
licensing agreement must be prior to the standardization of relevant technologies 
rather than to the outset of infringement because when infringement started, the 
relevant technologies may have already been dominant in the market.  
Finally, FRAND commitments are expected to remove IPR holders’ threat of 
injunction relief, thereby avoiding patent-ambush problem. In eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “the creation of a right is 
distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.” 129 Several Judges 
in the consent opinions pointed out that “for these firms, an injunction, and the 
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to 
practice the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component of the 
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed 
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to 
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compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.”130 
In recent German Orange book case, German Supreme Court examined to 
what extent FRAND commitments can remove injunction relief.131  In this case, the 
patent owners sued the defendants for infringement of a patent that was essential to 
“orange book” standard for CD, which all manufacturers of CD must comply with.  
The defendants argued that the patent owner abused its dominant position by refusal 
to conclude a patent licensing agreement with them on FRAND terms and conditions 
and was therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. The German Supreme Court stated 
that the standard implementers can defend themselves against a claim for injunctive 
relief asserted by the patent owner by pleading abuse of a dominant position in the 
market, and if the patent owner refused to conclude a patent licensing agreement with 
the defendant on FRAND terms and conditions. However, in order to apply the 
competition defense successfully, two prerequisites must be fulfilled. Firstly, the 
defendants must have made an unconditional and binding offer to the patent owners to 
conclude a patent licensing agreement, which could not have been rejected by the 
patent owner without violating the prohibition of discrimination or engaging in 
anticompetitive behavior; secondly, if the defendant has already be using a patent 
before the conclusion of a licensing agreement, it must anticipate its obligations under 
such a to be concluded licensing agreement by in particular paying or at least secure 
the payment of adequate royalties in a trustee account. In this case, the Court found 
that the above two conditions were not fulfilled, and the injunction relief was granted. 
The German Supreme Court decision implies that for standard implementers to 
benefit from the restraints that FRAND imposes on essential patent owners, they must 
similarly comply with their FRAND obligations of the licensees.132 However, it is still 
questionable, in the specific telecommunication standard circumstance. For example, 
there are thousands of patents declared as essential to the 3G UMTS standard, it is 
hard for the standard implementers to fulfill the conditions in the Orange book case. 
This complex situation demands an intermediary between standard implementers and 
essential patent owners to handle FRAND licensing issues. Only if standard 
implementers refuse to pay reasonable royalties, can injunction relief be granted. 
Another problem concerning FRAND licensing arises from non-disclosure 
agreement. Goldstein and Kearsey define “non-discriminatory” as that in which 
neither side suffers in comparison to similar deals struck by either of the parities with 
outside or other third parties.133 However, a non-disclosure agreement may make such 
comparison impossible. It is common practice for licensors and licensees to sign a 
non-disclosure agreement that keeps licensee fees and other conditions secret. In such 
a case, it is difficult to judge whether license terms are discriminatory because it is 
impossible to compare the conditions offered to the different licensees. To address 
this problem, FRAND licenses should be discussed in a public venue rather than 
hidden behind non-disclosure agreement. However, according to SSO IPR policies, 
SSOs should not be involved in such licensing issues. 
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V. Conclusion 
SSO IPR policies require SSO members to early disclose their essential IPRs 
and request these essential IPR holders to make FRAND licensing commitments, 
otherwise such IPRs may be exclude from a pending standard therefore not 
considered as essential anymore. By this approach, IPR policies seek to address patent 
hold-up and patent ambush problems, therefore ease the tensions between IPRs and 
standards. The legal practices in the EU and the U.S. show that there are clear rules to 
define FRAND licensing conditions. FRAND commitments may draw a balance 
between technology owners and standard implementers. On the one hand, it allows 
technology owner to get a fair return on their R&D investments in exchange for 
making their IPR available for implementation and implementers; on the other hand, 
standard implementers can get access to industry standards without worrying about to 
get injunction and pay excessive royalties, therefore avoid patent hold-up and patent 
ambush. However, some cases clearly show that the early disclosure rules in current 
SSO IPR policies may not function properly; as a result, it may render SSO members 
to circumvent the FRAND commitments, thereby posing a risk of patent ambush. 
Hence, it is necessary for SSOs to make an improvement on the early disclosure rules. 
Negative disclosure may fix these flaws that current disclosure rules have. 
To resolve the tensions between standards and IPRs would rely on 
combination of multiple approaches rather than only SSO IPR policy. Yet, 
undoubtedly a competent IPR policy can promote and facilitate other solutions.  
 
